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This paper reviews the most important changes, both in the economy and in the 
legal/institutional framework, to deal with unfair trade practices that Costa Rica has 
experienced during its trade liberalization process.  It also evaluates whether the sectors 
that as a result of such a process have been facing increased foreign competition, and may 
have attempted to use the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules adopted by Costa Rica 
as a protectionist instrument. Costa Rica’s legal framework against unfair trade practices 
at the multilateral level emerged when the country adopted the WTO rules on 
antidumping policies and safeguard measures.  That has been reinforced at the bilateral 
level through the subscription of free trade agreements with Central America, Mexico, 
the Dominican Republic, Chile and Canada.  So far, only six antidumping petitions and 
five safeguards have been received by the government. In reviewing these petitions, the 
government has paid particular attention to the impact of any action on the 
competitiveness of the domestic market and on the possibility that it would support 
modernization of the industry.  Behind the political acceptance of this disciplined 
approach lies widespread recognition of the social as well as economic progress that 
liberalization has supported.   3 
INTRODUCTION  
 
After the economic crisis of the early  1980s, the Government of Costa Rica 
decided to abandon its import-substitution strategy and move toward integration with the 
world economy through a gradual process of economic liberalization. During the same 
period, the country joined international organizations such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) with the purpose of having the legal instruments necessary to 
protect its commercial interests worldwide. As part of the agreements and commitments 
made, Costa Rica undertook a significant institutional transformation process in the field 
of foreign trade, creating institutions to safeguard the commercial rights of its 
businessmen (producers, exporters and importers) as well as of its citizens.  
 
Now, two decades after the start of the economic liberalization process, we are 
attempting to analyze the degree to which the country had to face unfair trade practices or 
to apply safeguard measures due to substantial increases of imports adversely affecting its 
productive sector. We are also interested in examining the degree to which the sectors 
that benefited from the previous import-substitution model—sectors that have been 
facing an increased foreign competition as a result of the elimination of tariff and non-
tariff barriers to imports—have attempted to make use of the protection mechanisms 
against unfair practices as a new protectionist instrument.  
 
This paper is organized into four main sections, plus an introduction and final 
considerations. The first section explores the reasons for the adoption of the new 
development model based on mid-1980s economic liberalization, the way in which this 
new model has been implemented and Costa Rica’s economic performance during these 
two decades of implementation. Sections II and III discuss the legal and institutional 
framework established by Costa Rica in order to respond to the complaints about unfair 
practices and safeguard measures. The fourth section contains a summary analysis of 
each of the cases brought before the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade by Costa 
Rica’s productive sector. Finally, the section on final considerations summarizes the main 

















Economic Liberalization: From Import Substitution 
to Export Promotion 
   5 
1.a What was the motivation for the liberalization of the economy? 
 
During the 1980s, many events contributed to precipitating the deepest economic crisis in 
Costa Rica’s recent history. This crisis—which, according to González (1989), resulted 
from a combination of structural and other short-term factors—made it necessary to 
review the development strategy pursued until then. The structural determinants of the 
crisis reflected a contradiction b etween the country’s main characteristics (a small 
domestic market, a relative abundance of a highly-specialized workforce and of natural 
resources) and the policies adopted as part of the import-substitution development 
strategy. The commercial policies g enerated a series of distortions of relative prices, 
giving rise to an anti-export bias as well as a reduction in the domestic consumers’ 
welfare and in the efficiency of domestic production (Taylor, 1984; Monge and Corrales, 
1988). The short-term determinants of the crisis included, most importantly, the oil crisis 
and the coffee boom of the mid 1970s, followed by the unfortunate domestic policies 
adopted in response to these events and the international inflation and recession of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s (González, 1984).  
 
The major macroeconomic indicators deteriorated rapidly between 1981 and 1982. 
Inflation reached 80% per year, the open unemployment rate amounted to 9% of the 
workforce, the GDP dropped by 10% in only one year, there was a sharp devaluation of 
the colon vis-à-vis the US dollar and the fiscal gap increased significantly (Lizano, 1992). 
Thus, both the groups that benefited from the import-substitution model and those that 
were adversely affected by it saw a need for a change of strategy. This situation fostered 
the adoption of a new economic development plan, the so-called “economic liberalization 




1.b What did the economic liberalization mean and how was it implemented? 
 
The economic liberalization model adopted by Costa Rica since the second half of the 
1980s seeks a greater integration of the country’s economy into the world economy. The 
objectives are to increase Costa Rica’s economic competitiveness in international markets 
and to provide it with an adequate price system. In order to attain these objectives, a set 
of reforms was established, which includes a greater opening of the economy to foreign 
competition by reducing protection for the activities which compete against imports and 
by eliminating the distortions in the domestic goods and factor markets, all of which 
reduced directly unproductive, profit-seeking activities (Bhagwati, 1982 and 1991); 
downsizing and modernizing the state, so that instead of hindering the growth of the 
private sector it would facilitate its development; granting compensatory subsidies and 
other incentives to non-traditional exports on a temporary basis, with the purpose of 
offsetting the anti-export bias generated by the import-substitution model; adopting stable 
macroeconomic policies, consistent with the liberalization model (Edwards, 1990; IMF, 
                                                 
1 There are still important reforms pending, such as the liberalization in utilities, telecommunications and 
insurance fields, tax exceptions for some agricultural products and State modernization.   6 
1998 and Mesalles, 1998), and promoting foreign investment by means of incentives 
characterized by its fiscal nature.
2  
 
1.c The Response of Costa Rica’s Economy to Economic Liberalization: A Long-Term 
Vision  
 
Although several studies individually show positive outcomes for Costa Rica’s economy 
during the economic liberalization period,
3 a comprehensive vision of the performance of 
that economy in the period under analysis is not available. This section addresses this 
topic, describing the behavior of Costa Rica’s economy during the last two decades 
(1983-2003) with a focus on trade, employment and poverty, to provide a long-term view 
of the results achieved through the liberalization of the economy.  
 
First of all, it should be noted that even though Costa Rica eliminated most of its tariff 
and non-tariff protection in industrial and agricultural activities, the process was carried 
out gradually. As shown in Figure 1.1, since 1986, when the first tariff reduction and 
simplification of the protectionist system took place, there was a rapid response in terms 
of trade flows. In fact, imports began increasing in a significant and sustained manner as 
did exports, the latter as a response of the export sector to the reduction of the anti-export 



















Source: Prepared by the authors based on figures from Banco Central de Costa Rica.  
 
It is worth noting that in 1984, along with economic liberalization, Costa Rica’s export 
products began enjoying free access to the US market (zero tariffs on almost all 
manufactured and agricultural products), thanks to the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the US market has grown in terms of its relative importance 
                                                 
2 Applying Lerner’s theorem (1936), Monge (1994) estimated that 0.66 out of each percentage point of 
protection granted to Costa Rica’s manufacturing sector during the import-substitution period was 
transferred as an implicit tax to the country’s export efforts.    
3 See Corrales and Monge (1990), Lizano (1992), Céspedes and Jiménez (1997), and Monge and Lizano 
(1997).   
 

























































































































































   7 
as a major destination for Costa Rica’s exports, from 26% in 1982 to 38% in 1992 and 
46.5% in 2003 (Figure 1.2). This was in part the result of a significant increase in foreign 
investment inflows, with the establishment of companies such as Componentes Intel in 
1998. 
 



















1982  1992  2003 
USA  CA & P  Rest of the World 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on figures from PROCOMER. 
 
The good export performance and the higher foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, 
together with an adequate foreign exchange policy, have resulted in a relatively 
satisfactory improvements in the balance of payments’ trade account, since although at 
present the current account deficit is higher in absolute terms, this deficit has tended to 
















Source: Prepared by the authors based on figures from Banco Central de Costa Rica. 
 
The l atter is a very important result, in view of the fact that the opponents of the 
liberalization process forecast that the trade balance would be wrecked as a consequence 
of import liberalization. Thus, the performance of Costa Rica’s economy during the last 
two decades demonstrates the profound economic understanding of the designers of the 
reform, as they took into account the general and not merely the partial equilibrium 
effects when designing and implementing the process of economic liberalization. In fact, 
             Figure 1.3   Costa Rica: Current Account Deficit  in US Dollars and as a Percentage of GDP           1983  -  2003    
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   8 
because of the prudent management of the fiscal, monetary and exchange policies, Costa 
Rica has been able to guarantee a neutral exchange rate (as measured by the real effective 

















Source: Prepared by the authors based on figures from Banco Central de Costa Rica. 
 
Attempts have been made to minimize the significance of the response of Costa Rica’s 
business community to the liberalization of the economy, by pointing out that the 
increase in Costa Rica’s exports is mainly associated with the foreign sales of the 
multinational companies under the free trade zone regime. The truth is that, although 
multinational companies are currently an important source of wealth for the country—by 
generating new and better employment sources and technology transfer to domestic 
businesses, among other positive effects—the results shown in the previous  figures 
underline the importance of the liberalization in achieving a better allocation of the 
resources of Costa Rica’s economy, along with the entry of multinational companies 
since the second half of the 1990s.
4 
 
The sustained growth of FDI inflows into Costa Rica is another positive outcome of 
economic liberalization, as it is an evidence of the foreign investors’ confidence in the 
new development model (Figure 1.5). Such investments have become not only an 
important source of jobs, but also a major destination market for products manufactured 
by domestic micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, turning them into indirect 
exporters (Monge et al., 2005). 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion on the positive effects of the companies under the protection of Costa Rica’s free 
trade zones, see Monge et al. (2004). 

















































































































































Source: Prepared by the authors based on figures from Banco Central de Costa Rica. 
 
Complementing the previous paragraphs, it should be pointed out that, thanks to the 
liberalization process, Costa Rica’s economy has succeeded in reducing its extremely 
high dependence on traditional activities, such as coffee, bananas, sugar and beef, for the 
generation of foreign exchange earnings. In fact, as shown in Figure 1.6, owing to the 
economic liberalization exports of non-traditional products have substantially increased 
their relative importance in total exports, from 38.6% in 1982 to 64.9% in 1992 and 87% 
in 2003. Such increased diversification of exports currently provides Costa Rica with 
greater economic stability and a more stable source of foreign exchange, thus avoiding 
the recurrent problems of the past, when a good economic performance was dependent on 
whether the price of coffee increased as a consequence of external impacts (for example, 
sleet in Brazil). Moreover, we might wonder about what the condition of Costa Rica’s 
economy would be, given the current crisis of the coffee sector, if this major 
diversification of exports had not taken place. 
 
  Figure 1.6   Costa Rica: Relative importance of 
























Source: Prepared by the authors based on figures from Banco Central de Costa Rica. 
 
It is also worth pointing out that the sustained growth of Costa Rica’s exports has been 
associated to an increase in the number of exporting firms, as well as to an important 
participation of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in this process. In fact, as 

















































































































































































































































































































   10 
shown in Figure 1.7, it is estimated that out of the over 1 ,700 currently exporting 
companies, 15% are microbusinesses and 58% are small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs).
5 Equally important is the increasing number of products exported by Costa Rica, 
which amounted to 3,565 in the year 2003, according to official data from the Promotora 
de Comercio Exterior de Costa Rica (Costa Rica’s Foreign Trade Promotion Bureau).  
 
 
                  Figure 1.7   Costa Rica: Composition of Exporting Firms 
                                        by Size of Firm - 2003 
(Percentage) 
SMEs, 58% 
Micro, 15%  Large, 27% 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on figures from PROCOMER. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that Costa Rica’s economic performance, linked to trade 
liberalization, has achieved three more major successes. First, it facilitated a reduction of 
the high levels of unemployment and underemployment that resulted from the foreign 
debt crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s; second, it has made it possible to absorb a 
large increase in the supply of unskilled workers that was the consequence of the 
important migration flows of people from Central America, mainly Nicaragua, that 
occurred in the last few years; and finally, it has managed to bring down the poverty level 




In addition to the positive outcomes of the economic liberalization model regarding trade 
flows, foreign investment, employment and poverty, it should be noted that although 
Costa Rica’s income distribution did not improve over the liberalization period, it did not 
worsen. In fact, according to the family distribution of income based on the per capita 
income of Costa Rica’s households, Gini’s coefficient has not changed much between the 
years 1987 (0.401) and 2003 (0.425), with an average of 0.395 for the period and a 
coefficient of variation of only 4.9%.
7  
                                                 
5 According to the records of C osta Rica’s Foreign Trade Ministry, the country had 1744 exporting 
businesses in 2003.  
6 In fact, according to figures from the last population census (2000), immigrants make up one fourth of 
Costa Rica’s population. 
7 Due to a change in the methodology for conducting the household survey in 1987, figures from previous 
years are not comparable. For that reason, the income distribution and poverty figures used in this paper are 
from 1987. However, for the purposes of our analysis, this situation is not a serious restriction, since Costa 
























Source: Prepared by the authors based on figures from Banco Central de Costa Rica. 
 
Costa Rica’s production behavior, in per capita terms, indicates that the new development 
model has provided greater robustness to the country’s economy, since it was not 
seriously affected by significant external events such as the Tequila crisis (1995), the 
Asian crisis (1999), the Argentine crisis (2001) and the most recent recession in the 
developed economies, notably the United States (2002).  
 
Summarizing, Costa Rica has managed to attain a positive economic performance over 
the last two decades, as a result of changing the development model from one based on 
import substitution to another of economic liberalization. Indeed, and as cited by 
numerous scholars and international organizations, Costa Rica is presented as an example 
of successful reform, albeit incomplete, in which no crisis episodes have occurred vis-à-
vis the greater degree of integration into world market (Figure 1.9), while there have been 
significant improvements in the fight against poverty. 
 
  Figure 1.8   Costa Rica: Per Capita GDP, Open Unemployment, Underemployment and 
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Source: Prepared by the authors based on figures from Banco Central de Costa Rica. 
 
 



































































































































































Legal Framework   14 
Although Costa Rica does not have domestic legislation regulating safeguards or anti-
dumping, the Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping and Safeguard Agreements are the 
cornerstone of the legal  framework that determines the parameters to identify and 
penalize such practices in Costa Rica’s imports from any WTO member country. 
Consequently, these agreements regulate dumping practices and the application of 
safeguard measures within the context of multilateral trade.  
 
Supplementing said international agreements—which Costa Rica adopted with the 
enactment of Law 7475 dated April 15, 1994—the country has established bilateral rules 
to regulate dumping practices and the application of safeguards in the various free trade 
agreements it has signed and approved to date, specifically with Central America, 
Mexico, Chile, the Dominican Republic and Canada.
8 
 
The purpose of this section is to present a summary of the basic rules established in the 
above-mentioned agreements in order to have a clear perspective of the way in which the 
safeguards and dumping issues are regulated at both the multilateral and bilateral levels. 
 
 
2.a Anti-Dumping Measures  
 
2.a.1  Anti-Dumping Measures at the Multilateral Level  
 
As mentioned above, the identification and penalization of dumping practices at the 
multilateral level is regulated by the Anti-Dumping Agreement of the Uruguay Round, 
signed and approved by Costa Rica in 1994. 
 
For the purposes of the Agreement, a product is considered as being dumped if it is being 
sold into another country’s market at a price that is less than the normal value for that or a 
like product (close substitute). The key to determine dumping in this Uruguay Round 
Agreement lies in the definition of “normal value”, since this is the parameter against 
which the price at which the product is being imported is compared. The normal value is 
defined in three alternative and mutually exclusive ways, which shall be applied in the 
following order according to the circumstances: 
 
a-  If the product under consideration is being sold in the exporting country’s 
domestic market, then the normal value is the selling price in said market.  
b-  If the product is not sold in the exporting country’ domestic market, then the 
normal value is the price at which said product (or the like product, as the case 
may be, i.e. a product which is either identical in all respects or has characteristics 
                                                 
8 In spite of the fact that the Free Trade Agreement with the United States (CAFTA) has already been 
signed by the executive branches of both parties, it is still pending approval by Congress in both countries. 
Consequently, the provisions on anti-dumping and safeguards contained in said Agreement are not yet part 
of the legal framework governing these matters in Costa Rica. For that reason, they have not been included 
in this section of the investigation. To review the provisions of CAFTA on those areas, see the text of the 
Agreement at www.comex.go.cr.   15 
closely resembling those of the product under consideration) is sold in a third 
country, provided that said price is representative. 
c-  If the product is neither sold in the exporting country’s domestic market nor in 
third markets—or when a special market situation or the low volume of sales in 
the domestic market of the exporting country does not make an appropriate 
comparison feasible—the normal value shall be determined as the sum of the per 
unit cost of production at the country of origin and a reasonable amount for 
administrative, selling and general costs and for profit.  
 
Likewise, the Agreement provides that when the export price is unreliable because of 
association or compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the importer or a 
third party, the export price may be constructed on the basis of the price at which the 
imported products are first resold to an independent buyer.  
 
Another relevant aspect is that the price comparison must be fair, in the sense that it must 
be made at the same level of trade, preferably at the ex-factory level and in respect of 
sales made at as nearly as possible on the same date.  
 
Once determined whether there is dumping or not and the amount thereof, the next step is 
a determination of injury to domestic production. In this respect, the Agreement provides 
that, for a determination of injury
9 to domestic producers, the investigating authorities 
shall examine both the volume of the dumped imports and their effect on the prices in the 
domestic market for like products, in addition to the consequent impact of these imports 
on domestic producers of such products.  
 
Two important elements in the Anti-Dumping Agreement of the Uruguay Round are the 
possibility of imposing provisional measures and the price undertakings. Provisional 
measures are countervailing duties that are applied on a strictly transitory basis and for a 
defined period of time. Such measures shall not be applied sooner than 60 days from the 
date of initiation of the investigation, shall be limited to a period not exceeding six 
months and their amount shall not be greater that the provisionally estimated margin of 
dumping. Thus, it is clear that imposing a provisional measure requires that a preliminary 
determination have been made of the existence of dumping and its consequent injury to a 
domestic industry, and also that it be considered necessary to establish such measure to 
prevent the persistence of injury during the investigation. 
 
Price undertakings, on the other hand, are voluntary agreements whereby the exporter of 
the product being dumped undertakes to revise its prices or to cease exports to the area in 
question at dumped prices so that the authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of 
the dumping is eliminated. Price increases in such undertakings need not be equivalent to 
the estimated margin of dumping, but simply sufficient to remove the injury to the 
domestic industry. Evidently, the acceptance of this type of undertaking requires that, as 
in the case of provisional measures, a preliminary determination of the existence of 
dumping, its amount and the injury it causes to domestic production has been made.  
                                                 
9 The term “injury” means material injury or threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material 
retardation of the establishment of such an industry.     16 
 
When the investigating authorities complete the investigation by determining the 
existence of dumping and of injury to domestic production—and in the absence of a price 
undertaking by the exporter—it shall proceed to impose a  final measure, i.e. a 
countervailing duty, with the purpose of offsetting the injury caused by the artificial 
manipulation of the price by the exporter with predatory purposes in the domestic market 
of the importing country. The Agreement is clear in that such measure will remain in 
force only while it is strictly necessary and at the most for five years as from the date of 
its imposition, unless the investigating authorities determine in a review that it is essential 
to maintain it because, should they terminate it, the dumping and injury would continue 
or recur.  
 
 
2.a.2  Anti-Dumping Measures in the Central American Common Market 
 
As regards bilateral trade with Central America, the application of anti-dumping 
measures is properly regulated by the Central American Regulations on Unfair Trade 
Practices, adopted on December 12, 1995 by the Central American Economic Council in 
the framework of the treaty establishing the Central American Common Market and as a 
response to the commitments made during the Uruguay Round by each of the countries in 
the region within the context of the establishment of the WTO. 
 
Before its accession to the GATT, Costa Rica had the Industrial Protection and 
Development Act (Ley de Protección y Desarrollo  Industrial), covering dumping in 
Articles 10, 11 and 12.
10 However, it was never enforced, given the high tariffs that 
existed and the limited opening of the economy to foreign competition. Furthermore, 
there was no specific institutional framework for the enforcement of said legislation.  
 
The Regulations establish an Investigating Authority (IA), which shall be the Directorate-
General of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade (MEIC, in Spanish) or, as the 
case may be, the Directorate responsible for regional integration affairs in each country in 
the Isthmus or the technical unit in charge of the investigation of unfair trade practices. 
However, in the case of a regional procedure (i.e. a joint complaint of all the countries in 
the region against a third one), the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration 
(Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana - SIECA) will be responsible for 
the investigation. 
 
The IA shall investigate, analyze and evaluate the alleged unfair trade practices and 
decide whether is appropriate to recommend the application of duties or anti-dumping 
measures, be they provisional or final. Applications for initiating an investigation may be 
made by the representatives of the domestic industry responsible for the product 
adversely affected by t he imports, but can also be the result of an administrative 
initiative, as provided under WTO rules.  
                                                 
10 The Industrial Protection and Development Act, passed on May 18, 1960, authorized the Ministry of 
Econmy, Industry and Trade (MEIC, in Spanish) to take the necessary measures to counteract unfair trade 
practices.    17 
 
In case an application for investigation is accepted by the IA, it shall notify the 
government of the country of origin or export of the product to be investigated, and shall 
afford it an opportunity to hold consultations aimed at clarifying the facts raised in the 
application. 
 
Investigations must be completed within 12 months of date of their initiation and only 
under exceptional circumstances may they be extended for a further period of 6 months. 
However, within 60 days the IA shall issue an affirmative or negative preliminary 
determination on the case.  
 
Figure 1 summarizes the process of a dumping complaint investigation in Costa Rica on 
imports originating in Central America.   18 
 
Figure 1: Stages in the Process of a Dumping Complaint in Costa Rica, 




Note: The Minister has the power to terminate the process at any stage.  
The IA is the Investigating Authority, an agency reporting to the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade. 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of the Central American Regulations on Unfair Trade Practices. 
Industry representatives request the initiation 
of an investigation to the IA 
The IA determines whether requirements are 
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If the application is rejected, a period is set 
to correct and resubmit it 
If pending requirements are met, it is 
returned to the process; otherwise it is filed 
The exporting government is notified of the 
initiation of the investigation by the IA 
Start of the period of consultations among 
the parties involved in the process 
Start of investigation with definition of 
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provisional measures to the Minister 
The investigation is completed and a report is sent 
to the Minister for a final decision 
Minister announces final decision 
The measures continue or expire pursuant to 
the final decision 
If there is sufficient evidence, the IA initiates 
the investigation 
The IA issues preliminary determination   19 
 
2.a.3  Anti-Dumping in the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico 
 
In the case of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Mexico, Chapter VIII defines the 
guidelines relating to the application of anti-dumping measures in the form of 
“countervailing quotas” and not duties, as is the typical case. However, it is worth 
mentioning that, according to the provisions of Chapter VIII, countervailing quotas can 
be used not only to offset dumping practices but also export subsidies.  
 
As regards the conditions required to impose an anti-dumping measure, Chapter VII of 
the FTA with Mexico refers to the GATT provisions, i.e. the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
of the Uruguay Round. The only particular specifications made in this chapter have to do 
with the conditions required for the accumulation and establishment of “regional injury”, 
as well as some aspects of the process related to resolutions, notifications, retroactive 
application, hearings, review and elimination of final measures.  
 
 
2.a.4  Treatment of Dumping in other Free Trade Agreements 
 
On the other hand, Chapter VII of the free trade agreements with Chile, the Dominican 
Republic and Canada contains provisions regarding the application of anti-dumping 
measures, setting forth that the parties can establish the application of countervailing 
duties in response to dumping practices, pursuant to the Uruguay Round Agreement in 
question. 
 
However, the FTA with Canada goes a bit further by providing for the interest of the 
parties to promote improvements and clarifications of the GATT 1994 provisions, as well 
as the desire to establish a procedure at the domestic level that incorporates broader 
issues of public interest. Furthermore, it sets forth the possibility of applying 
countervailing duties less than the margin of dumping and recommends a transparent and 
predictable method for the imposition of such duties, so that the final determinations of 
duties may be more easily reviewed.  
 
 
2.b. Safeguard Measures 
 
2.b.1  Safeguard Measures at the Multilateral Level 
 
Safeguard measures at the multilateral level are governed by the Agreement  on 
Safeguards of the Uruguay Round, signed and adopted by Costa Rica in 1994.
11 
 
The basic condition set by said Agreement for the imposition of safeguard measures is 
that the imports of a certain product is being imported in such increased quantities, 
                                                 
11 In this Agreement, safeguard measures are also called “Emergency Action on Imports of Particular 
Products.”    20 
absolute or relative to domestic production, that they cause or threaten to cause serious 
injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products.
12 
 
The key element for the application of safeguard measures is the determination of injury. 
According to the Agreement in question, “serious injury” is understood to mean a 
significant overall impairment in the position of a domestic industry. Furthermore, it is 
clearly established that the “threat of serious injury” must necessarily be based on 
concrete facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility.  
 
To determine injury, the investigating authorities have the express obligation to evaluate 
all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature, since the imposition of a 
safeguard measure will not be warranted unless the investigation  demonstrates the 
existence of the causal link between increased imports and serious injury to the domestic 
industry concerned.  
 
The measure to be applied may be a duty or a quantitative restriction (quota), in which 
case the amount of the measure shall not be less than the average of the product’s imports 
over the 3 years prior to the beginning of the investigation. It is also established that it is 
possible to apply provisional safeguard measures provided that the existence of critical 
circumstances where any delay would cause injury to domestic production that would be 
difficult to repair is confirmed.  
 
The duration of such provisional measures shall not exceed 200 days, and they may only 
take the form of tariff increases to be promptly refunded to importers should the 
investigation conclude that there is no evidence of a causal link between increased 
imports and serious injury to the domestic industry. Additionally, the duration  of any 
such provisional measure shall be discounted from the initial duration of a final safeguard 
measure, should it be imposed as a result of the investigation.
13 
 
The Agreement provides that countries will be able to apply final safeguard measures 
only for such a period of time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury 
and facilitate adjustment. However, the duration of said period is limited to a maximum 
of 4 years, at the conclusion of which it is possible to grant an extension provided that it 
is demonstrated that the measure continues to be necessary to prevent or remedy the 
injury or to complete the period of adjustment of the domestic industry.
14 The extensions 
of a safeguard are limited, however, since the agreement provides that the total period of 
application of a final safeguard measure, including the period of initial application and 
any extension thereof, shall not exceed 8 years.  
 
                                                 
12 The Agreement defines “domestic industry” as the producers as a whole—operating within the territory 
of a WTO Member—of the like products of or the products competing directly with the good under 
investigation.  
13 It should be borne in mind that the term “final measure” refers to the definitive nature of the final 
resolution of the investigating authorities and not to an undefined duration of the measure in time.  
14 Although not explicitly defined in the Agreement, the term “adjustment” seems to be understood as a 
process of productive reconversion in which resources of the affected activity are mobilized towards other 
activities not susceptible of being injured by imports.   21 
Additionally, a product to which a safeguard measure has been previously applied shall 
not be the subject to a new measure until a period equal to that during which such 
measure had been previously applied has elapsed, provided that the period of 
nonapplication is at least two years.  
 
One last relevant aspect of the Uruguay Round Safeguards Agreement is that it forbids 
the application of any such measures against imports of a product originating in a WTO 
developing country Member when such imports do not exceed 3% of the total imports of 
that product in the importing Member allegedly affected by the increased in imports.  
 
 
2.b.2  Safeguards in the Central American Common Market 
 
In the Central American region, the legislation that is applied by the country regarding 
safeguard measures is governed by the Central American Regulations on Safeguard 
Measures, adopted on May 22, 1996 by the Central American Economic Council in the 
Tegucigalpa Protocol with the purpose of bringing the regional rules in line with the 
agreements adopted in the framework of the Uruguay Round.  
 
In general, the investigation procedures and timeframes are similar to those applied in the 
case of anti-dumping measures. The investigation process can be initiated at the request 
of a party or, exceptionally, by administrative initiative. The technical study shall be 
completed within 6 months,  except under special circumstances, where it may be 
extended to a maximum of 12 months.  
 
It is possible to apply provisional measures, but they shall be guaranteed by bonds, to be 
promptly refunded if the subsequent investigation does not determine that increased 
imports have caused or threatened to cause serious injury to a domestic industry. 
Furthermore, before the adoption of any provisional measure, the Member State shall 
notify the WTO’s Safeguards Committee. Once a provisional measure is imposed, the 
authorities of the Member State shall hold consultations with WTO Member countries 
that have a particular interest in the measure.  
 
 
2.b.3  Safeguards in the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico 
 
In the case of the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico, the application of safeguard 
measures is authorized both at the bilateral (against imports originating in Mexico) and 
global (against imports from Mexico and other countries) levels.  
 
Safeguards of a bilateral nature shall be applied before 24 months have elapsed from the 
date the tariff on the product in question reached 0%. Additionally, it is established that 
the only measures that may be adopted are tariff measures. 
 
An interesting aspect in which the rules on bilateral safeguards contained in the FTA with 
Mexico deviate from the WTO bilateral rules concerns the period of application of the   22 
safeguard. In fact, it may be applied only once, for a period of time that shall not exceed 
one year and with a single possibility of extension for a like period. Moreover, the level 
of the measure shall not be higher than the tariff in force for third countries or than the 
tariff that was in force before the effective date of the tariff reduction defined in the 
Treaty.   
 
Another distinctive element in the application of safeguards under the FTA with Mexico 
is the fact that the party imposing the safeguard measure must offer the affected party a 
compensation mutually agreed upon during the consultations that shall consist of 
additional tariff concessions (reductions), the positive effects of which on the trade of the 
party causing the injury are equal to the impact of the safeguard measure.  
 
In the case of global safeguards, their imposition on imports of a specific product 
originating in Mexico only applies when: 
 
-  They are part of the exports of the main supplying countries and these 
represent no less than 80% of the total imports by the affected country of 
the product in question. 
 
-  The rate of increase of the imports from Mexico of the product 
concerned during the year when their injury increase occurred is slightly 
lower, equal or higher than the rate of increase of the imports of the same 
product originating in any country during the same period. 
 
The procedure for the application of global safeguards in the FTA with Mexico covers 
the issues relating to investigation, notification and consultations that were mentioned in 
connection with bilateral safeguards, but not those linked to the tariff concessions for the 
party affected by the safeguard measure. 
 
 
2.b.4  Safeguards in the Free Trade Agreement with Chile 
 
As regards the FTA with Chile, the application of safeguard measures is duly outlined in 
Chapter VI, both in the case of bilateral (i.e. only against imports from Chile) and global 
(against imports originating in a group of countries including Chile) measures. 
 
The period during which the parties may impose safeguard measures and keep them in 
force (for the purposes of the Treaty, the “transition period”) is restricted to the time 
required to reduce the tariff on the product plus an additional two-year period as from the 
date on which the product becomes completely tariff-free, which is identical to what is 
provided for in the FTA with Mexico.   
 
In the FTA with Chile, the only applicable safeguards are tariff measures, and their 
imposition may take the form of either a suspension of the tariff reduction agreed under   23 
the Treaty or an increase of the tariff rate to a level that under no circumstances may 
exceed the most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff rate bound in the WTO.
15 
 
An element in common with the Costa Rica-Mexico FTA regarding the application of 
bilateral safeguards is the obligation to offer, in exchange for the imposition of a 
safeguard measure, a compensation (tariff reduction) with effects equivalent to those of 
the safeguard. What is new in the FTA with Chile is that this obligation to offer a 
compensation to the other party is extensive to global safeguards.  
 
However, the FTA with Chile clearly departs from the FTA with Mexico as regards to the 
period of application of bilateral safeguards, since it is established that such safeguards 
shall have a maximum duration of 3 years, which may be extended for a period of one 
consecutive year. Additionally, during the transition period a bilateral safeguard shall be 
applied to a product no more than two times, the second application only being possible if 
a period equivalent to at least half the time of the period during which the measure was 
first applied has elapsed.  
 
Another novelty in the FTA with Chile concerning the application of bilateral safeguard 
measures is the gradual elimination of the measures. Equally new is the obligation to 
exclude the other party from the imposition of the global safeguard measures in which it 
is involved. Thus, when imports from Chile have a substantial share in the total imports 
of the product in question and significantly contribute to the serious injury caused to 
domestic production, Costa Rica will have the obligation to exclude Chile from the 
application of the corresponding global safeguard measure.  
 
As in the case of the application of bilateral safeguards, the Agreement provides for a 
procedure for global safeguards, in which elements such as consultations, notifications, 
hearings and the provision of objective evidence to the other party guarantee the 
transparency of the process.  
 
 
2.b.5  Safeguards in the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic 
 
In the case of the FTA with the Dominican Republic, an innovation introduced in the 
treatment of safeguards is the definition of “domestic industry”, since it is established that 
the domestic producers of the like products or the products that directly compete with the 
imported product subject to the safeguard measure must account for at least 25% of the 
total domestic production of that type of product. 
 
Regarding the duration of the transition period and the periods of application of the 
measure, the treatment is identical to that of the FTA with Mexico. 
 
A rather peculiar aspect in the treatment of bilateral safeguards in the FTA with the 
Dominican Republic is the fact that the compensations in the form of tariff reductions 
                                                 
15 The lowest of the following MFN tariffs will apply: the one in force at the time the measure is adopted 
and that in force on the day prior to the effective date of the Treaty.   24 
offered in exchange for the imposition of safeguards—which are mandatory in the 
treaties with Mexico and Chile—are optional in this case and are left to the discretion of 
the party applying the safeguard measure. In case of failure to agree on the compensation 
to be offered in exchange for the safeguard (tariff reduction on other products), the 
requesting party shall be able to impose it unilaterally while the party subject to the 
safeguard measure may unilaterally impose the compensation it deems relevant.  
 
2.b.6  Safeguards in the Free Trade Agreement with Canada 
 
Finally, as to the Free Trade Agreement with Canada, the treatment of safeguards is much 
briefer,  inasmuch as it only deals with the application of bilateral measures (i.e. only 
against imports originating in Canada). 
 
Thus, a transition period is established, the duration of which is restricted to the time 
scheduled for the reduction of the tariff on a product, while the maximum duration of 
safeguard measures is limited to 3 years without the possibility of an extension; the 
measure may be applied only a second time provided that after the expiration of the first 
application period no less than half of its duration has elapsed. During the second 
imposition of the measure, the tariff shall not be higher than that applied the first time the 
safeguard was in force, while during this second application it is mandatory to establish a 
time schedule for a gradual tariff reduction so that, at the date of final expiration of the 
measure, the tariff will remain at the level specified for the product in question in the 
tariff reduction schedule under the Treaty.  
 
It is also provided that no safeguards shall be applicable after the expiration of the 
transition period—except when accepted by the other party—and that the party imposing 
a safeguard has the obligation to negotiate and agree on the respective compensation with 
the other party, the party affected by the safeguard having the possibility of adopting a 

















Institutional Framework   26 
As indicated in the previous section, the application of anti-dumping and safeguard 
measures in Costa Rica relies on the relevant agreements of the Uruguay Round at the 
multilateral level, and on the various free trade agreements signed by the country at the 
bilateral trade level. 
 
Within this context, by Official Communication DM-822-95 dated September 4, 1995 the 
Ministry of National Planning and Economic Policy (MIDEPLAN, in Spanish) 
authorized the creation of the Office of Unfair Trade Practices and Safeguard Measures, 
reporting to the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade (MEIC, in Spanish), which 
would be responsible for investigating, analyzing and evaluating cases involving unfair 
trade practices and safeguard measures, as well as advising the Minister of the MEIC on 
the application of anti-dumping duties, safeguards and countervailing measures. 
 
The Office was operational between 1995 and 2000, when MIDEPLAN issued Official 
Communication DM-23-00, whereby, due to the restructuring of the MEIC, the functions 
of the Office were transferred to the Legal Affairs Unit (UAJ, in Spanish) of said 
Ministry. Pursuant to this Official Communication, on December 6, 2000 the MEIC 
published a decree to that effect, although it had argued that transferring the 
responsibilities of the Office to the UAJ generated an inconvenient combination of 
functions.  
 
Based on interviews and conversations held with government officials concerned with the 
subject and with advisors of domestic companies involved in  investigativeprocesses, it 
was concluded that, among the major restrictions experienced by the MEIC’s Office 
during its operation, the following may be mentioned:  
 
•  Financial restrictions. 
•  Staff limitations and lack of continuity. 
•  Shortage of staff specializing in economy and international trade matters. 
•  Lack of training and updating of specialized knowledge on the subject. 
•  Processes tended to become delayed, partly due to the reluctance of the applicant 
companies themselves to provide information, but also as a consequence of the 
above-mentioned staff limitations  and the lack of an adequate budget. 
 
Even though the Office operated under financial and staff constraints ever since it was set 
up, Mr. Douglas Alvarado, currently responsible for processing complaints on the matters 
in question, was of the opinion that the authorities justified the disbanding of the Office 
based on the fact that only a fewapplications for investigation were being received. 
 
The Legal Affairs Unit, for its part, continues following the same procedures prescribed 
in the relevant legislation, but does not have a dedicated work team for that purpose. 
Moreover, the person within the Unit who is responsible for processing any applications 
regarding anti-dumping, safeguards and countervailing measures is not exclusively 
assigned to this task, but also performs duties specific to the MEIC’s UAJ. On the other 
hand, while legal work is carried out by the Legal Affairs Unit, technical investigations   27 
are submitted to the MEIC’s Economic Department, a task it also has to fulfill in addition 
to its respective responsibilities.
16 
 
It should be noted that although the Office ceased operations in the year 2000, on August 
23, 2002, the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade issued a new decree mandating 
its creation with legal personality. This time it would report to the Office of the Minister 
and was given exclusive responsibility over cases involving unfair trade practices and 
safeguard measures, except those cases where international treaties grant powers to other 
departments; but even under those circumstances, these departments would work in 
cooperation with the Office.  
 
Pursuant to this new decree, several tasks and duties were assigned to the Office, namely: 
 
•  Receiving and processing complaints concerning dumping and subsidies, as well as 
applications for the imposition of safeguard measures. 
•  Conducting studies or investigations to determine the validity of the complaints and 
the need to impose measures. 
•  Advising the Minister and other areas of the Ministry on these matters. 
•  Advising industries on the operation of the Office. 
•  Providing guidance to interested parties on the appropriate use of international 
protection instruments.  
•  Advising interested parties on the proper filing of a complaint and the gathering of 
relevant evidence. 
 
Although the institution of the Office is clearly outlined in the above-mentioned decree, it 
has not yet been created. Investigation processes are still carried out by the Legal Affairs 
Unit of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade.  
 
According to Mr. Douglas Alvarado, responsible for these matters at the MEIC’s Legal 
Affairs Unit, in spite of the fact that the order for the re-establishment of the Office dates 
back to almost two years ago, the financial resources required are not available, there is a 
lack of specialized staff and there is little support to domestic industries due to the 
shortage of professionals specializing in international trade in the market, capable of 
advising businesses during the complaint process. Such limitations pose an enormous 
challenge for Costa Rica, since the various free trade agreements have given rise to a 
multiplicity of rules and provisions that demand a more robust and efficient institutional 
structure capable of properly managing their enforcement. 
 
In this sense, Mr. Alvarado pointed out that it would be advisable to consider the 
alternative of creating this investigating office by law rather than by decree, with the 
purpose of reducing the involvement of political interests to a minimum. Lucrecia 
Brenes, a specialized private advisor, fully agreed with that opinion.  
 
                                                 
16 Based on an interview with Mr. Douglas Alvarado, currently responsible for processing applications 
related to anti-dumping, safeguards and countervailing measures.   28 
Furthermore, it should be noted that apart from the MEIC, the country’s institutional 
framework also comprises the Ministry of Foreign Trade (COMEX, in Spanish), which is 
responsible for notifying cases to the WTO, while the Ministry of Finance, through the 
Customs Directorate-General (DGA, in Spanish), is in charge of the implementation of 
the measures on imports. Although Costa Rica’s experience in the application of 
safeguard and anti-dumping measures is limited to a single case (jute sacks), the 
performance of the DGA in this case raises doubts on the quality of the country’s inter-
institutional coordination to implement this type of measure adequately.
17 
 
While the imposition of safeguards and anti-dumping measures is part of the enforcement 
of the trade agreements to which the country is a party and the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
has an office to this end, it seems that in order to guarantee a better implementation of 
such measures by Customs it is necessary to strengthen the inter-institutional 
coordination role to be played by the COMEX.  
                                                 
17 In the jute sacks case, although the measure should be implemented for only 30 days, it was applied by 
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4.a A Case Study of Complaints about Alleged Dumping Practices  
 
From 1995 to date (2004), the MEIC’s Investigating Authority has received six 
complaints about alleged dumping practices, which will be analyzed below.
18 Out of 
these, four concerned the manufacturing sector (Chapters 25 to 99 of the Central 
American Tariff System - SAC), while only two of the cases involved the agricultural 
and agroindustrial sectors (Chapters 01 to 24 of the SAC).
19 This distribution is consistent 
with Costa Rica’s import structure, which—as a consequence of the high tariff protection 
prevailing over the most important agricultural products for domestic consumption—is 
mostly concentrated on manufactured products. 
 
Table 4.1   Costa Rica: Dumping Cases 
 
Year  Product  Sector  Related Countries  Complainant or Applicant 
1995  Acrylic sheets  Manufactures  Mexico  Acrílicos de Centroamérica S.A. 
1996  Refrigerators  Manufactures  Mexico  Atlas Industrial S.A. 
1996  Fresh onions  Agriculture  USA, Nicaragua and Guatemala  National Association of Onion Producers 
1996  Fiber cement sheets  Manufactures  Mexico  Ricalit S.A. 
1997  Pasta  Agroindustry  Chile  Pastas Roma S.A. 
1998  Sanitaryware  Manufactures  Venezuela  Incesa Standard S.A. 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on data drawn from the resolutions on the dumping cases dealt with 
by the MEIC. 
 
It is also worth pointing out that all of the complaints relate to imports originating in 
countries of the Americas;  Mexico stands out for having three complaints against it, 
while two concern South American countries, and one, the United States together with 
two Central American countries. 
 
This structure is extremely interesting since, although Mexico is not a prominent trade 
partner for Costa Rica, it is clear that the trade liberalization stemming from the Free 
Trade Agreement signed by both nations in 1995 revitalized trade links to a sufficient 
extent for Costa Rica’s producers engaged in supplying the domestic market to pay much 
more attention to the prices offered by Mexican suppliers.  
 
Moreover, of the six applications filed with the Investigating Authority, no dumping 
injury was found in two cases; two cases were dropped due to failure to submit the 
required information; in one case no measure was applied because it was not confirmed 
that the injury was directly caused by the imports, and only in one case it was decided to 
apply a tariff measure, which ended up being 0% since the imports virtually disappeared.  
 
                                                 
18 No complaints about alleged dumping practices or applications for countervailing measures were filed in 
Costa Rica prior to 1995. 
19 The Central American Tariff System is derived from the Harmonized System and, therefore, it coincides 
with the latter as regards the first six digits of the headings or less.   31 























Acrylic sheets  X  X  X    X
3       
Refrigerators      X  X
4  X       
Fresh yellow onions      X          X 
Fiber cement sheets  X  X             
Pasta  X  X             
Sanitaryware      X        X
5   
1 The firm decided to withdraw the application for investigation. 
2 In cases where injury was found but no measure was applied, the existence of other non-import factors that were also causing injury was determined. 
3 No injury was found because of lack of evidence of injury or threat of injury. 
4 The firm withdrew the application but the investigation was continued by administrative initiative. 
5 The measure applied amounted to 0% since imports decreased to almost nil. 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on data drawn from the resolutions on the dumping cases dealt with 
by the MEIC. 
 
Due to space limitations, only one of the six cases of dumping reported in Costa Rica is 
described below for illustration purposes. 
 
 
4.a.1 The Refrigerators Case 
 
In October 1996, the company Atlas Industrial S.A. applied for a dumping investigation 
against imports of refrigerators (classified under item 84.18.21.00 of the SAC) 
originating in Mexico. 
 
The applicant company argued that from May to September 1996 these imports had 
entered Costa Rica under dumping conditions, which, together with the fact that domestic 
and imported models are classified as homogenous and under the same tariff heading, in 
its judgment, gave rise to the conditions required to initiate an investigation. The 
company further argued that it accounted for 100% of the domestic production of 
refrigerators, and was therefore representative of the domestic industry involved. 
 
In March 1997, Atlas Industrial S.A. withdrew the case, arguing that it had reached an 
agreement with the importing firm. However, a few days later the MEIC required Atlas to 
produce documentation evidencing such agreement, but Atlas did not provide any 
documents, indicating that the agreement had been of an informal nature, for which 




It is interesting to note that both the Mexican exporter (Mabe S.A. de C.V.) and its 
importing counterpart in Costa Rica (Mabeca, the sole importer of refrigerators from 
                                                 
20 Agreements between the parties must involve the Government and the importing or exporting firm, 
wherefore the “deal” between the domestic producer and the exporting company outside  the legal 
framework governing such arrangements was considered illegal. For that reason, the MEIC decided to 
continue the investigation on its own initiative, since it considered that national interests could be 
compromised, and also submitted the case to the Commission on the Promotion of Competition.   32 
Mexico at the time of the investigation) submitted all the documentation required by the 
Investigating Authority, as opposed to Atlas, which did not. 
 
The Investigating Authority determined that refrigerator imports from Mexico accounted 
for 35.5% of the total imports of that product in 1996. Besides, it found evidence of 
dumping on those imports, which was estimated to be 32% over the product’s normal 
value. This result is not apparent in the figures of Table 4.3, where it may be seen that the 
value in US dollars per unit of weight (kilogram) of refrigerator imports, originating both 
in Mexico and the rest of the world, significantly increased in 1996, this increase being 
greater in the case of Mexico (32%) than in the case of the rest of the world (4%). 
 
Table 4.3   Costa Rica: Refrigerator imports 
1994-2002 
(Figures in dollars and kilograms) 
 
Mexico  Rest of the world 
Year  
Value  Volume  US$/Kg  Value  Volume  US$/Kg 
1994  562,756  138,409  4.07  9,317,673  2,156,017  4.32 
1995  638,105  168,393  3.79  6,846,208  1,533,760  4.46 
1996  1,777,664  355,587  5.00  6,640,731  1,426,152  4.66 
1997  2,376,751  548,106  4.34  7,525,276  1,718,870  4.38 
1998  2,101,208  609,683  3.45  8,688,999  2,056,394  4.23 
1999  2,850,069  904,441  3.15  9,068,508  2,372,896  3.82 
2000  2,610,767  780,547  3.34  8,624,939  2,385,894  3.61 
2001  2,588,674  727,741  3.56  12,773,567  3,128,140  4.08 
2002  4,245,819  1,185,072  3.58  16,877,366  4,491,867  3.76 
2003  5,358,228  1,500,316  3.57  13,356,334  3,657,160  3.65 
 
After reviewing the available information, the Investigating Authority concluded that 
there was no evidence to believe that the increase of imports under dumping conditions 
was causing injury to domestic production, and that, in its judgment, the decrease in 
Atlas’ profits was primarily due to the reduction in the “other income” account, which 
dropped by 68% during the period in question. In other words, the erosion of Atlas’s 
profits was the consequence of a reduction of income different  from that derived from its 
sales of refrigerators in the domestic market and therefore could not be linked to the entry 
of imports under dumping conditions. 
 











units   422  356  2561 
Source: MEIC’s resolution published in the Official Gazette. 
 
Consequently, the MEIC concluded the investigation in September 1997 without 
imposing anti-dumping duties on the imports of refrigerators from Mexico. It is also 
worth noting that the Investigating Authority proceeded to notify the Commission on the 
Promotion of Competition so that it would investigate the agreement reached by the   33 
parties involved, under the assumption that the two companies might be colluding to 
implement discriminatory practices to the detriment of free trade.   
 
 
4.b A Case Study of the Applications for the Imposition of Safeguard Measures 
 
Between 1995 and 2004, the MEIC’s Investigating Authority received a total of five 
applications for the imposition of safeguard measures, four of  which involved 
manufactured products (classified under Chapters 25 to 99 of the Central American Tariff 
System) and one the agricultural sector, specifically milled and paddy rice.
21 
 
This distribution is approximately consistent with Costa Rica’s import structure, since as 
a result of the high tariff protection prevailing over the most important agricultural 
products for domestic consumption, imports tend to be primarily manufactured products. 
 
It is also worth pointing out that, out of the five applications, one was filed against 
imports from Asian countries, four against imports from countries in the Americas, and 
one against imports from Europe.
22 This is consistent with the structure of Costa Rica’s 
imports by origin, since virtually two thirds of them originate in North and Central 
America. 
 
Table 4.5   Costa Rica: Safeguard Cases 
 
Year  Product  Sector  Related Countries  Complainant or Applicant 
1995  Bast fiber sacks  Manufactures  Nicaragua, India and Bangladesh  National Cabuya Board 
1996  Used Apparel  Manufactures  United States  Textile and Apparel Industry Association 
1996  Ceramic blocks and 
tiles 
Manufactures  Spain, Italy, Brazil and Mexico  Productos de Concreto S.A. y Firenze Industrial 
S.A. 
1996  Sanitaryware  Manufactures  Mexico  Incesa Standard S.A. 
2000  Milled and paddy 
rice 
Agriculture  United States  National Rice Board 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on data drawn from the resolutions on the cases dealt with by the 
MEIC. 
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in only one of the cases (ceramic blocks and 
tiles) an investigation failed to be initiated since the applicant firms dropped the case and, 
therefore, did not submit the information required by the Investigating Authority. In only 
two of the five applications injury to domestic production caused by imports was found 
and, although in both cases it was decided to apply a provisional measure, only in one 
(jute sacks) was the measure finally imposed, since in the case of rice the application of 
the measure was not deemed necessary in view of the increase in the international prices 
of this grain, which made imports less attractive. 
 
                                                 
21 No application of this type was submitted prior to 1995. 
22 The total number of cases classified by regions is six since the ceramic blocks and tiles case involves 
countries from the Americas (Mexico and Brazil) as well as European countries (Italy and Spain).   34 























Bast fiber sacks      X      X    X 
Used apparel      X          X
2 
Ceramic blocks and 
tiles 
X  X             
Sanitaryware          X
3       
Milled and paddy 
rice 
        X
4       
1 In cases where injury was found but no measure was applied, the existence of other non-import factors that were also causing injury was determined. 
2 No measure was applied due to other reasons, such as underinvoicing and smuggling. 
3 The Authority did not deem it necessary to apply any protective measure since the firm is internationally competitive. 
4 No measure was applied since the increase in international prices rendered it unnecessary. 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on data drawn from the resolutions on the cases dealt with by the 
MEIC. 
 
Due to space limitations, only one of the five cases in which an application for the 




4.b.1 The Jute Sacks Case 
 
In September 1995, the National Cabuya Board filed an application for an investigation 
to impose a safeguard measure against imports of bast fiber sacks—classified under item 
63.05.10.00 of the  Central American Tariff System—originating in Nicaragua, 
Bangladesh and India. 
 
The National Cabuya Board requested this measure because ofthe massive increase in 
imports of jute sacks, mainly from Bangladesh, arguing that this situation directly 
affected both the domestic production of cabuya sacks and the marketing of coffee, since 
jute and cabuya sacks are used to package coffee for export.  
 
In the application, the requesting party mentioned that Bangladesh is the source of 55% 
of the world’s exports of jute, while Costa Rica’s production amounts to less than 0.2% 
of the Bangladesh production; this situation could cause serious injury to the domestic 
production of cabuya sacks. Furthermore, the National Cabuya Board noted that 
Bangladesh granted its exporters subsidies covered under the WTO agreements.
23 
 
During the investigation of this case, the Investigating Authority found that most of the 
import flows affecting the sector originated in Nicaragua, but that in the year 1995 
Bangladesh had been the origin of around 40% of Costa Rica’s total imports of this 
product, a significant figure since in 1994 Bangladesh had not exported a single sack to 
Costa Rica. 
                                                 
23 The MEIC indicated that when unfair trade results from the granting of a subsidy in the exporting 
country, the proper measure is a countervailing duty rather than a safeguard.    35 
 
The data shown in the following table for imports of cabuya sacks per country of origin 
draws attention to the fact that in 1995 Nicaragua increased its exports to Costa Rica 
more than twofold compared to the previous year. This situation, together with the large 
increase of imports from other countries (including Bangladesh), meant an aggregate 
increase of 290% in the total imports of cabuya sacks to Costa Rica in that same year. 
 
Table 4.7   Costa Rica: Origin of cabuya sacks imports 
1992-1995 
(In –units) 




Sacks imported from 
Bangladesh and other 
countries 
1992  371,490  332,409  39,081 
1993  286,582  253,596  32,986 
1994  209,218  209,218  0 
1995  816,683  489,609  330,074 
Note: The periods correspond to January-August of each year. 
Source: MEIC’s resolution published in the Official Gazette No. 91, May 13, 1998. 
 
These figures confirm the substantial increase in imports that would result in the eventual 
injury to the domestic production of jute sacks. Unfortunately, the case’s file and the 
respective MEIC’s resolution fail to provide any information or analysis of the impact (if 
any) of said increased imports on the domestic production of jute sacks.  
 
Likewise, there are no data available on the sector’s evolution or its share in production 
and employment. However, given that one of the main uses of jute sacks is to package 
coffee for export, the behavior of coffee exports could well shed some light on the 
potential impact of the increased imports of cabuya sacks on domestic production. 
 
According to figures from the Central Bank of Costa Rica, the volume of coffee exports 
(in 46-kilogram sacks) decreased by 3% in 1995, which is consistent with most of the 
years of that decade, with the exception of 1996, when the volume of coffee exports 
recorded an increase of 23%. Taking into account that jute sacks are n ot a perishable 
product and that coffee is usually traded in futures markets, it makes sense to consider 
that the increase in the volume of coffee exports in 1996 would explain part of the 
increase in jute sacks imports in 1995. 
 
That means that around one tenth of the increased cabuya sacks imports recorded in 1995 
had no direct effect on domestic production, since it was simply meeting an increase in 
the demand for the product to be used to package coffee for export.
24 However, even 
though there is no information on the behavior of the other activities that use jute sacks as 
an input, it seems reasonable to assume that the remaining 267 percentage points of 
increase in jute sacks imports did cause an important crowding out of domestic 
production in the local market. 
 
                                                 
24 Indeed, the positive expectations created by the increased sales of coffee abroad could have induced 
coffee businesses to increase their stock of packaging material.     36 
Based on the investigation, the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade (MEIC, in 
Spanish) finally decided to apply a provisional measure that would be a tariff increase 
from 54% to 140% for a period no longer than 30 days. The implementation of the 
measure implied that the National Cabuya Board would commit itself to improving the 
use of the established capacity and production in order to have a better situation once the 
measure expired, an aspiration that does not seem quite reasonable because  it entails 
long-term aspects that require much more than 30 days.  
 
It is equally interesting to point out that the Investigating Authority also determined that, 
although it was true that there had been a substantial increase in cabuya sacks imports in 
1995, to a great extent this was a response to the lack of supply in the domestic market, 
because since 1992, domestic production failed to meet domestic demand.   
 
In 1997, the MEIC lifted the provisional measure that had been imposed based on the 
realization that its application had gone on for over six months, when it actually should 
have only been applied for 30 days. Therefore, and after verifying that the domestic 
industry had not made anyadjustments or improvements, the MEIC finally decided to 
close the investigation in April 1998, and not to impose any final measure.  
 
This confirms that, although the imposition of the safeguard measure does not seem to 
have stemmed from protectionist intentions, its incorrect implementation did provide a 
margin of protection beyond what was contemplated. 
 
 
4.c  Summing Up 
 
The figures in Table 4.8 show that the applications for the imposition of safeguards and 
anti-dumping measures have mostly focused on manufactured goods, not surprising in 
view of the fact that Costa Rica still retains a high protection rate for basic consumption 
agricultural products.  
 
Table 4.8   Costa Rica: Summary of Cases Dealt With by the Investigating Authority 
Manufactures Agriculture
Safeguards 4 1 5
Antidumping 4 2 6





Source: Prepared by the authors based on data drawn from the resolutions on cases dealt with by the MEIC. 
 
By the same token, Figure 4.1 shows that the applications for the imposition of measures 
not only have been rather balanced between safeguard and anti-dumping measures, but 
also have had a relative lag between the date of entry into force of the rules (1995) and 
the year when the last case was submitted (2000).   37 
 
Figure 4.1   Costa Rica: Summary of Cases Dealt With by the Investigating Authority 
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1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Safeguards  Anti-dumping   
Source: Prepared by the authors based on data drawn from the resolutions on cases dealt with by the MEIC. 
 
Although elements such as failure to produce information by the applicant companies and 
the results of the statistics reported in this document suggest that several of the 
applications for the imposition of safeguard or anti-dumping measures seem to have 
merely responded to protectionist interests; the case of milled rice is the only one where 
there appears to have been an economic policy scenario that somehow influenced the 
final imposition of measures. In this case, the technical criterion of the Investigating 
Authority indicated that a measure was not warranted, but even so the MEIC’s authorities 
decided to impose a provisional safeguard. The decision was influenced by the strong 
pressure that local producers brought to bear on the competent authorities involved.
25 
Indeed, in a later review of the case by the General Controllership of the Republic, 
serious deficiencies were found in the procedure for the adoption of the final resolution 
issued by the MEIC. 
 
Another important element to be underlined is the fact that in those cases in which the 
Investigating Authority carried out the investigation process, the contents of the files 
revealed a rather superficial economic analysis of the cases. In fact, this made it 
necessary for the authors of this paper to search for statistics that could at least give an 
approximate idea of the relevant economic environment in which each of the 
investigations following the applications took place, since in general the files are lacking 
in figures and analysis.  
 
Summarizing, it cannot be asserted that there is evidence in the sense that Costa Rica’s 
institutional structure to process applications for safeguard and anti-dumping measures 
was working perfectly. Furthermore, an individual and detailed analysis of the cases leads 
to the conclusion that actually there have been attempts, albeit failed ones, to use such 
measures in Costa Rica with protectionist purposes. As a corollary to all these, it may be 
said that Costa Rica has made a reasonable use of such instruments to date. 
                                                 
25 A review of the press reports of the year 2000 is sufficient evidence of the pressure exerted by the 
producers of this grain on the Government of the day.   38 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Although the process of economic liberalization initiated by Costa Rica in the second half 
of the 1980s has not yet been completed, because there are still important sectors that 
enjoy protection against foreign competition (mainly telecommunication services, 
insurance and some agricultural products), it may be asserted that, from an economic 
perspective, at the beginning of the 21st century Costa Rica is very different from the 
Costa Rica of the early  1980s. At that time, the economy was characterized by a 
preponderance of two export crops as major sources of foreign exchange earnings (coffee 
and bananas), a limited inflow of foreign investment and the participation of the state in 
many diverse productive activities, all of the above as a result of an import-substitution 
development model, which also generated rent-seeking activities that are not directly 
productive (Bhagwati, 1982) and, therefore, important losses in terms of welfare for the 
majority of Costa Ricans (Monge and González, 1995). 
 
Today, 20 years later, Costa Rica is characterized by the diversification of its exports (in 
terms of products, firms and destinations), trade liberalization (reduction of i mport 
barriers), the consolidation of a tourism industry cluster, the entry of important flows of 
foreign investment, mainly high-tech, and a decrease in the direct participation of the 
state in some productive activities.
26 To a great extent, all of these results can be 
attributed to the economic liberalization process initiated by Costa Rica in the mid 1980s, 
designed and implemented under the rule of law in a democratic regime.  
 
The performance of Costa Rica’s economy over the period 1986-2003 may be considered 
satisfactory, since it exhibits important transformations in its production system, as well 
as improvements in the fight against poverty, the generation of new sources of 
employment and the lack of deterioration of income distribution.  
 
The empirical evidence on safeguards and unfair competition policies shows that the 
country has had to respond to very few complaints in this field ( 11  in total). After 
analyzing each of these complaints, it may be argued that there have been attempts by 
some companies or business organizations to seek new forms of protection against 
imports during the economic liberalization period. However, Costa Rica’s government 
has been very careful in handling these requests and has acted in accordance with the 
standards established in the relevant legal instruments, thus avoiding an undue 
application of such instruments. The exception to the rule has been the case of rice, where 
it seems that the result of the complaint did respond to political pressures, which, 
according to the political economy theory, results from the search for directly 
unproductive, profit-seeking (DUP) activities by the companies involved.  
 
It should be noted that in the case of manufacturing companies, although the applicant 
firms settled in Costa Rica under the umbrella of the previous import-substitution model, 
                                                 
26 It is worth pointing out that the Government of Costa Rica stopped participating in productive activities 
such as those of cement and ethyl alcohol by privatizing the respective State companies. For a detailed 
analysis, see Dennis Meléndez H. and Mauricio Meza R. 1993. CODESA: origen y consecuencias. San 
José: Fiduciaria de Inversiones Transitorias (FINTRA).   39 
currently many of then have succeeded in completing an important transformation and 
have become exporters (for example, Atlas Industrial and Pastas Roma) for which foreign 
markets count. Contrary to this, many agricultural activities that brought complaints 
about unfair trade practices or safeguards are still highly protected in Costa Rica (for 
example, onions, which even succeeded in being excluded from the Central American 
Free Trade Agreement – CAFTA).  
 
Regarding the evolution of the legal rules on dumping and safeguards in force in Costa 
Rica, the review conducted in this paper clearly indicates that through the process of 
negotiation of bilateral free trade agreements, Costa Rica has improved its rules 
governing these matters, particularly in terms of providing faster and more transparent 
mechanisms to process applications, as well as reducing the timeframes during which 
such measures may be imposed and remain effective.  
 
In the specific case of safeguard measures, elements such as the security that has to be 
deposited by the applicant in the case of the imposition of a provisional measure within 
the framework of the Central American Regulations on this matter, or the compensation 
in the form of tariff concessions that has to be offered to the other party against the 
imposition of a safeguard in the framework of the bilateral free trade agreements signed 
to date, clearly reveal that the rules have included the necessary provisions to prevent 
domestic companies from carelessly requesting the application of safeguard measures 
merely with protectionist purposes. 
 
In the analysis of the institutional arrangements and the procedures that need to be 
followed by applicant businesses, it was found that the forms they have to fill out are not 
complex to the point to be inaccessible for the companies, although completing them 
does require time and some knowledge on the subject. The need for expertise is 
important, since it was revealed by the interviews with MEIC’s officials and 
representatives of Costa Rica’s business sector that the country lacks sufficient skilled 
human resources to adequately advise the private sector on how to file applications for 
the imposition of anti-dumping and safeguard measures.  
 
Furthermore, it still seems to exist an important gap in the institutional framework, 
particularly in the MEIC, to appropriately deal with this type of complaint. In fact, 
currently there is no specialized office to take care of these applications due to the low 
number of complaints that have been filed. For that reason, the cases are referred to the 
MEIC’s legal department. This limitation is being analyzed by Costa Rica’s authorities, 
trying to strike a balance between the private sector’s needs in this regard and the 
opportunity cost of the resources available at the Ministry to discharge all of its 
responsibilities. 
 
In that respect, a possibility to be explored is transferring the responsibility for processing 
unfair trade practices complaints and safeguard applications to the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade (COMEX, in Spanish), since the COMEX is the agency in charge of managing 
trade agreements (multilateral and bilateral) signed by Costa Rica, both in terms of the   40 
free trade agreements and the country’s obligations under the WTO, besides having a 
budget for such purposes.  
 
Summarizing, Costa Rica has succeeded in making progress toward economic 
liberalization during the last 20  years without having to face economic crises; it has 
effectively fought against poverty and confronted important flows of immigration and 
maintained low and stable levels of unemployment and underemployment, all without a 
deterioration of income distribution. Moreover, the country has successfully managed to 
respond to complaints about unfair trade practices and substantial increases in imports 
that can affect domestic production, appropriately differentiating authentic cases from 
those that would seem to be new protectionist endeavors. However, Costa Rica still faces 
an important challenge to efficiently manage its commitments and responsibilities in 
terms of anti-dumping and safeguard policies, as a result of lacking appropriate 
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